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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE RELIANCE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 





STATE;MENT OF KIND OF CA:SE 
This is an action by a surety to recover from 
an indemnitor under an indemnity agreement for 
expenses and legal fees incurred 'by the surety by 
reason of its ·having executed a Motor Vehicle Deal-
ers Bond as surety. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The defendant was granted summary judgment 
upon the grounds that a judgment rendered in a 
previous action in which General Credit Company 
~ued the plaintiff herein upon the Motor Vehicle 
Dealer's Bond mentioned iabove for loss resulting 
from the dfeault of Glenn Hollins, Inc., principal 
upon said bond, was res judicata of plaintiff's right 
1 
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to recover from the defen·dant herein who is an 
individual indemnitor. 
RELI'EF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff seeks a reversal of the lower court's 
judgment in favor of the defendant 1and prays for 
judgment in its favor as a matter of law as to its 
right to recover from the defen~dant as an indem-
nitor on the bond in question and that the action 
be reman·ded to the lower court for trial to !allow 
plaintiff to prove its damages, or that failing, for 
a new trial 011 all issues. 
STATE'MENT OF FACTS 
On June 20, 19'54, the defendant, Glennard M. 
Hollins made application to the plaintiff for a motor 
vehicle dealer's bond to be issued in the name of 
Glenn H1ollins, Inc., principal, and upon which the 
plaintiff would appear as surety. The application 
contained an indemnity ~agreement which was sign-
ed by the defen·dant in his individual capacity, 
whereby he agreed to reimburse and imdenmify the 
plaintiff for any loss, damage, or expense which 
it 1night incur or sustain as a result of having ex-
ecuted said bond (R. 24-25). In consequence of said 
applieation, plaintiff issued its bond as surety there-
on effective July 6, 1954 (R. 21). 
Glenn Hollins, Inc., subsequently floor planned 
certain autom'Obiles with General :Credit Company, 
a financial institution. Under such an arrangement, 
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automobiles but deliver possession thereof to the 
dealer for the purpose of selling the same. When a 
~ale was completed, the dealer would payoff the 
existing obligation with the financial institution for 
the automobile sold and the finan·cial institution 
would deliver the title thereof to the dealer for de-
li,·rt·y to the purchaser (R. 14-15). 
On October 25, 1954, Glenn Hollins, Inc. sold a 
1952 Buick to one Irene Pittingall; and on Decem-
ber 12, 1954, it sold a 1953 Oldsmobile to one J. C. 
Miller (R. 17). For reasons unknown to appellant, 
Glenn Hollins, Inc. was unable to deliver title cer-
tificates for sai1d automobile to the purchasers 
thereof since General Credit Company refused to 
surrender the same. However, General Credit Com-
pany eventually on or about April 1'5, 19'55, deliv-
ered the title certificates directly to the purchasers 
of the automobiles in question (R. 18). 
On November 15, 1HS5, General Credit Com-
pany filed an action against the plaintiff and ap-
pellant herein in the T'hird Judicial District Court 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, Civil No. 
106828, alleging conversion of the aforementioned 
automobiles by Glenn Hollins, Inc., to its damage in 
the sum of $3,282.00 and th1at the ·defendant, plain-
tiff and appellant herein, was liable to it as surety 
on the motor vehicle dealer's bond pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 41-3-18, Utah Code Annotated, 
1953 (R. 1-3). 
The Trial Court in that action granted judg-
3 
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ment in favor of the defendant, plaintiff and appel-
lant herein, no cause of action, after finding the 
following facts: 
(a) That Glenn Hollins, Inc. was in pos-
session of the 1952 Buick automobile and the 
195'3 Oldsmobile automobile with the knowl-
edge ~nd consent of General Credit Company 
.and disposed of the same through resale in the 
regular course of business with the knowledge 
and consent of General Credit Company (R. 
17 para. 5 & 6) . 
(b) That Glenn Hollins, Inc. did not will-
fully, wrongfully, or without the knowledge 
and ·consent of General Credit Company dis-
pose of the automobiles in question (R. 17 
para. 7). 
(c) That Glenn Hollins, Inc. did fail, ne-
glect ~and refuse to pay General Credit Com-
pany the amount owing on the aforementioned 
automobiles at the time of their resale (R. 
1'7 para. 8) . 
Subsequently, the present action was commenc-
ed by the p'laintlff and appellant herein, to recover 
from the indemnitor Glennard M. Hollins for costs 
1and expenses which it h·ad suffered by reason of 
having execute'd the motor ve'hicle dealer's bond as 
surety ( R. 19-·2;5). The matter came on regularly 
for hearing on January ·20, 1964, but before the 
trial commenced, defendant made a motion to dis-
miss on the groun,ds that the findings and judgment 
in the prior case of General Credit Company vs. 
Reliance Insur~ance Company of Philadelphia, Third 
4 
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.Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, State 
of lJtah, (~ivil No. 106828, were res judicata to the 
i~suP~ raised in the present action and that as a 
rnatter of law the plaintiff could not recover. The 
trial court granted this motion and entered judg-
ment in favor of the defendant. ( R. 35). 
Appellant made a timey motion that the trial 
court amend its findings, con·clusions of law, and 
judgment, an·d for a new trial to allow the ~appellant 
to prove its damages ( R. 36-40), but the motion 
\ras denied ( R. 41). 
ARGUMEN'T 
POINT I. 
THE FINDIN·GS O·F THE CO'URT ARE NOT 
DETER~l'IN.ATIVE OF THE ISSUES RAISED BY THE 
PLEADINGS AND DO NO·T S'UPPORT THE JUD·G-
:\IENT RENDERED. 
Plaintiff's cause of action is based on a con-
tract between the parties. The ·basic rallegations of 
the com paint ( R. 19-25) are that plaintiff executed 
and issued as surety a Motor Vehicle Dealer's Bon·d 
(Para. 3), that the defendant, Glenn1ard M. Hollins, 
executed the application for said bond (Para. 4) 
\vhich contained and indenmity agreement as set 
forth in Exhibit "B" to the com·plaint, an·d that the 
plaintiff was subject to a law suit ·an'd sustained 
damage by reason of its having executed said bond 
(Para. 7). 
It is admitted that the complaint in paragraph 
5, 6, and 7 incorrectly designates the defendant as 
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the person which made the sales of the two cars 
in question, received the monies therefor, and was 
unable to deliver the titles thereto, rather than the 
corporation Glenn Hollins, Inc., defendant's alter 
ego. However, pl1aintiff attempted to correct this 
drafting error by its proposed fin'dings of fact which 
correctly designate Glen Hollins, Inc. as the party 
responsible for these acts. The trial court should 
have granted plaintiff's motion to include the find-
ings set forth by it since they were all facts that 
were either not denied in the pleadings or were 
found by the court in the General Credit Company 
vs. Reliance Insurance Company of PhiladelphifL 
case. 
'The fiact that plaintiff's complaint incorrectly 
stated the 1defendant as the tort-feasor rather than 
the corporation, Glenn Hollins, Inc., should not be 
considered fatal to plaintiff's cause of action because 
the action alleged by the pl1aintiff in its complaint 
is one based on contract, i.e., the indemnity agree-
ment contained in the application for the used motor 
vehicle dealer's bond; it is not a tort action. The 
reference to the defaults as alleged in pa~agraphs 
5 and 6 of plaintiff's complaint merely state why 
pl~aintiff was sued upo11 its bond as surety. These 
allegations are actu1ally items which could have been 
left for evidence at trial since plaintiff's complaint 
would have been sufficient if it allege!d only (a) 
that the plaintiff executed the bon·d in question as 
surety, (b) that defendant agreed to indemnify the 
6 
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plaintiff for any expense, loss, or damage which 
it experienced by reason of having executed said 
bond, and (c) that plaintiff ·h·ad sustained a loss 
because of h·aving executed said bond. 
The findings, conclusions of law, an'd judgment 
of the trial court as they now stan·d are not respon-
~ive nor determinative of plaintiff's claims for re-
irnbursetnent under the in·demnity ·agreement. The 
findings merely set forth that the trial ·court found 
in the prior action of General Credit Company vs. 
Reliance Insura·nce Company of Philadelphia, supra, 
that the defendant in this action, Glennard M. Hol-
lins, did not commit the acts which cause·d the plain-
tiff ·and appellant herein to be sued as surety on 
the motor vehicle dealer's bon·d and that Glenn Hol-
lins, Inc. ·did not violate provisions of Section 
41-1-65, U;C.A., 19·53 with respect to General Credit 
Company. They include no findings as to whether 
or not the defendant, G'lennard M. Hollins, agreed to 
indemnify the plaintiff for expenses incurred by 
reason of its having executed said bond or whether 
the plaintiff incurred expenses or loss as a result 
of having executed the bond. The principal issue in 
this case is not whether the defendant, Glennard M. 
Hollins, caused the damages which plaintiff claims 
to have suffered, but whether he agreed to reim-
burse the pl~aintiff for any loss it might suffer by 
reason of having executed the 'bond in question. This 
issue was not determined ·by the trial court in the 
instant case since the only evidence introduced at 
7 
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the hearing of defendant's motion to dismiss was the 
file in the piror case of Gener~al Cr.edit Company vs. 
Reliance Insurance Comp1any of Philadelphia, supra, 
and at no place in the pleading, fin·dings, or judg-
ment ren·dered in that action was the issue of in-
demnity raised or determined. And, in fact, it could 
not have been since defen·dant herein was not a 
party to that action and no rights against him could 
·have \been determine·d. This point was recently af-
firme\d by this court in a con·demnation proceeding 
State vs. Parker, 13 U. 2·d 65, 368 ;P.2d 585, ( 1962). 
Further, it appears to be a well settled rule 
that a judgment which goes beyond the pleadings 
is invalid. In Rosenthyne vs. Matthews - McCoul-
louch Co., 51 U. 38, 168 P1ac. 957 ( 1917) the trial 
court ordered the plaintiff to repay to the defendant 
a certain sum of money for which relief was not 
prayed in the answer, and this Court quoting 23 
Cyc. 816 at page 43 stated: 
"A judgment must accord with an·d be war-
ranted by the pleadings of the party in whose 
favor it is rendered; if it is not supported by 
the pleadings, it is fatally defective.: 
Likewise, this Court stated in Stockyards Natiorval 
Bank of South Omaha vs. Br~agg et al, 76 U. 60, 
245 Pac. 966 ( 1925) at page 81: 
''It is fundamental that a petition or plead~ng 
of some kind is the juridical means of vesting 
the ·Court with jurisdiction of subjec.t m~tter 
to adju·dicate it, and a judgment which IS be-
8 
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yond or not supported by the pleadings must 
fall.'' (Emphasis added) 
In both of the foregoing cases, the trial court had 
granted affirmative relief outside the pleadings and 
this Court held that such judgment was invalid. It 
i~ appellant's position that judgment denying relief 
based on findings which do not determine the essen-
tial allegations of the compaint is, likewise, a judg-
rnent rendered outside the pleadings, and therefore, 
invalid. 
As previously stated, the only evidence intro-
duced at the hearings 'before the trial court was the 
file in General Credit Company vs. Rel~ance In-
snrance Company of Philadelphia, supra, and the 
judgment rendered in the instant case reflects this 
fact ( R. 35) in that it states in part: 
'~The entire file and evi'dence in Civil No. 
106828 was received into the evidence, E. L. 
Schoenh~als having moved the Court for a 
dismissal with prejudice in behalf of ·defen-
dant and stated the basis for said motion into 
the record and invited the Court's attention 
to the pleadings, facts and evidence and ad-
vised the Court on the law . . . . " 
Defendant ~and respondent has previously raise·d 
the defense that the plaintiff and appellant herein 
should have sued the principal on the bond in ques-
tion, Glenn Hollins Inc., and recovered an unsatis-
fied judgment before pursuing the defendant. 
''nether such a procedure is generally legally neces-
5al'Y or not is moot because as the records of the 
9 
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Secretary of State for the State of Utah show, the 
charter of said corporation was revoked on Septem-
ber 21, 1H56 for nonpayment of taxes, over two 
and one half years before this action was com-
menced. 
CONC'LUSION 
Appellant contends that its right to recover 
from the defendant on the indemnity agreement in-
corporated as part of plaintiff's complaint has 
never been determined in this or any other lawsuit 
and the trial court erred in granting summary judg-
ment to the defendant and respon·dent herein. 
WHEREFORE, appellant prays that the judg-
ment of the trial court be reversed and prays for 
judgment in its favor as a matter of law to its right 
to recover from the defendant on the indemnity 
agreement in question and that the ~action be re-
manded to the trial court to allow plaintiff to prove 
its damages, or that failing, for a new trial on all 
. Issues. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN 
H. Wayne Wads worth 
909 Kearns Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
10 
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